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A B S T R A C T   
Sketching while narrating is effective for eliciting information and veracity cues in single interviews. In the 
current research, we tested this technique in multiple interviews. Participants were interviewed three times over 
three weeks about a genuine (truth tellers) or a fabricated (lie tellers) memorable event. They sketched while 
narrating in Week 1, Week 2, Weeks 1 and 2, or not at all (verbal statement only). Statements were coded for 
total, core, peripheral, and common knowledge details, self-handicapping strategies, complications, plausibility, 
and proportions of complications and core details. In the third interview and across interviews, the Sketch in-
struction resulted in a higher proportion of core details. Truth tellers reported more total and core details and 
complications and fewer common knowledge details and exhibited a higher proportion of complications than lie 
tellers. Truth tellers’ stories also sounded more plausible than lie tellers’ stories. The interaction effects were not 
significant. Thus, sketching while narrating seemed to have a similar effect on truth tellers and lie tellers in the 
current study.   
1. Introduction 
In the last decade, interview techniques have been developed to 
enhance or elicit verbal cues to deceit (Granhag & Hartwig, 2015; 
Nahari, 2019; Vrij et al., 2017). Such techniques were typically tested in 
single interview settings. This contrasts with real life interviews where 
suspects are often interviewed on multiple occasions over a period of 
time (Alison et al., 2014; Home Office, 2020). In the current experiment, 
we examined the efficiency of the sketching while narrating interview 
technique in multiple interviews. 
1.1. Sketching while narrating as an effective interview technique to elicit 
information 
Sketching while narrating, that is sketching while talking at the same 
time, leads to more information from truth tellers than just narrating 
(Dando et al., 2009; Eastwood et al., 2018; Leins et al., 2014). At least 
five reasons contribute to this effect (Vrij, Mann, et al., 2020). First, 
sketching mentally reinstates the context of the interviewees’ 
experiences which in turn enhances recall. Second, unlike verbal state-
ments, sketches are visual outputs and therefore a more compatible 
output format when recalling visually experienced events. Third, 
sketching is a time-consuming activity which gives (truthful) in-
terviewees good opportunity to search their memory, thus facilitating 
recall. Fourth, sketching one aspect of the event cues retrieval of other 
aspects of the same event. Fifth, sketching automatically leads to the 
provision of spatial information as interviewees must situate each 
described person or object somewhere in the sketched location. This 
contrasts with verbal statements in which interviewees do not always 
spontaneously report where persons and objects are exactly. 
1.2. Verbal cues to deception 
Lie tellers and truth tellers differ in the amount and type of detail 
they provide (Amado et al., 2016; Vrij, Leal, Jupe, & Harvey, 2018). The 
deception research to date that tested the effectiveness of sketching 
while narrating (Vrij, Leal, Jupe, & Harvey, 2018; Vrij, Mann, et al., 
2020) focused on the total amount of detail and on the following three 
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detail types: (a) common knowledge details which comprise scripted 
information that is commonly known by people (“The event had an 
Oscars theme so everybody was dressed up”); (b) self-handicapping 
strategies which are justifications presented by interviewees for why 
they cannot provide certain information (“There isn’t much to say about 
the actual bungee jump as it took only a few moments”); and (c) com-
plications which are details that make the story more complex than 
necessary (“I started going down the mountain and I realised I haven’t 
clicked my boot into the ski correctly”). We therefore focus on these cues 
in the current research. 
Generally, truth tellers report more total details and complications 
and fewer common knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies 
than lie tellers (Vrij et al., 2019; Vrij, Leal, Mann, Fisher, et al., 2018). As 
memory of a genuine event is often richer in detail than memory of an 
imagined event (Johnson & Raye, 1981; Sporer & Sharman, 2006), truth 
tellers are able to produce many details and complications (Amado et al., 
2016). In contrast, lie tellers tend to keep their stories simple (DePaulo 
et al., 2003; Hartwig et al., 2007), so they may not be willing to provide 
many details or complications, because this will make a story complex 
(Vrij, 2005; Vrij & Vrij, 2020). The absence of a genuine experience of an 
event may prompt lie tellers to rely on common knowledge details when 
providing information or to avoid including certain information and 
providing a justification for that (Vrij, Leal, Mann, Fisher, et al., 2018). 
In addition to the abovementioned four cues, we also examined core 
details and peripheral details. Core details are details that are central to 
the event under consideration, and, if altered, change the event, whereas 
peripheral details are details that do not change the main event (Herlihy 
et al., 2002; Heuer & Reisberg, 1990). As an example, an interviewee 
reporting about being stung by a jellyfish may state details concerning 
the core event (“I suddenly felt this really painful stinging in the bottom 
of my leg”), but then talk about peripheral details (“The hotel had sea 
turtles that laid their eggs on the beach”). Researchers generally agree 
that truth tellers are more likely to include core details in their state-
ments than lie tellers, but there is less agreement concerning peripheral 
details (Deeb et al., 2018; Leal, Vrij, Vernham, et al., 2019). Where 
differences emerged, lie tellers reported more peripheral details than 
truth tellers (Deeb et al., 2018; Leal et al., 2018). This can be explained 
by lie tellers’ unwillingness to provide false core details as they want to 
keep their stories simple (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008), so they compen-
sate for that by reporting peripheral details, possibly from past experi-
ence or from commonly known events (Deeb, Vrij, Leal, Verigin, & 
Kleinman, 2020). 
Examining a mixture of cues to truthfulness (complications or core 
details) and cues to deceit (common knowledge details, self- 
handicapping strategies, and peripheral details) allows researchers to 
introduce within-subjects measures by comparing aspects of the same 
statement and using the interviewee as his or her own control (Vrij, Leal, 
& Fisher, 2018). Within-subjects measures are generally preferred by 
practitioners (Vrij, 2016, 2019) and scholars (Nahari et al., 2019; Nahari 
& Vrij, 2015). The proportion of complications is an example of a 
recently introduced within-subjects measure. This proportion score 
compares the number of complications in a single statement to the total 
number of complications, common knowledge details, and self- 
handicapping strategies in that statement (complications/[complica-
tions + common knowledge details + self-handicapping strategies]), 
and it is often found to be higher among truth tellers than lie tellers 
(Leal, Vrij, Deeb, & Kamermans, 2019; Vrij, Leal, Jupe, & Harvey, 2018; 
Vrij & Vrij, 2020). Another within-subjects measure that was examined 
in only one previous study (Deeb, Vrij, & Leal, 2020) and that was also 
found to be higher among truth tellers than lie tellers is the proportion of 
core details (core details/[core details + peripheral details]). 
A cue that has been shown to be one of the most robust veracity cues 
with the largest effect sizes to date is plausibility, or the extent to which 
the story looks believable (DePaulo et al., 2003; Sporer et al., 2020; Vrij, 
Deeb, et al., 2020). Truth tellers’ stories often sound more plausible than 
lie tellers’ stories. Plausibility is typically measured on a rating scale and 
can be assessed in real time during the interview. This makes it poten-
tially an appealing cue for practitioners. 
1.3. Sketching while narrating may affect truth tellers and lie tellers 
differently 
Sketching while narrating may have a different effect on truth tellers 
and lie tellers. Since, truth tellers’ memory of an event is typically richer 
than lie tellers’ memory, sketching should facilitate memory recall more 
among truth tellers than among lie tellers. It may therefore strengthen 
the differences in total details and complications between truth tellers 
and lie tellers (Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann, et al., 2018). If the request to 
sketch while narrating makes lie tellers think that they have to provide 
more information, it may strengthen veracity differences for common 
knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies. Also, if truth tellers 
focus more on core details whereas lie tellers focus more on peripheral 
details, veracity differences may be strengthened further as a result of 
the sketching instruction. Derived from this, strengthening these ve-
racity effects would automatically make the proportion of complications 
and core details scores more diagnostic. In a similar vein, the richer 
additional details truth tellers report as a function of sketching may 
sound more plausible than the additional details lie tellers report. If so, 
the sketch instruction will also strengthen the plausibility veracity 
effect. 
1.4. Sketch and veracity effects in multiple interviews 
In multiple interview settings, an earlier interview may have an ef-
fect on the performance in a following interview. An early recall attempt 
by truth tellers may strengthen episodic memory and cue retrieval of 
various aspects of an event (Gabbert et al., 2009). This in turn reduces 
the extent of forgetting and facilitates later recall by truth tellers who 
potentially add new information in subsequent interviews (Vrij, Leal, 
Fisher, Mann, et al., 2018). This may be particularly the case if memory- 
enhancement techniques such as sketching instructions are introduced 
in these earlier interviews (Izovotas et al., 2018). In contrast, lie tellers 
would be expected to report the same information over time, because 
they are typically concerned with appearing consistent during in-
terviews (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999). To achieve this, lie tellers 
rehearse a statement prior to the first interview and make sure they 
repeat the same information in subsequent interviews (Deeb et al., 2017; 
Vredeveldt et al., 2014). 
2. The current study 
We examined the effects of sketching while narrating in three in-
terviews (Time 1, Time 2, and Time 3)—each interview one week apart. 
The instruction to sketch and narrate was presented in Week 1 only, 
Week 2 only, Weeks 1 and 2, or not at all (Sketch control condition). We 
tested the Sketch, Veracity, and Sketch × Veracity effects at Time 3 and 
across the three interviews (unique details). We expected the same re-
sults to emerge in both analyses; Hypotheses 1 to 3 reported below 
therefore apply to both analyses. 
Hypothesis 1. Participants in the Sketch Weeks 1 and 2 condition will 
report the most total details, core details, peripheral details, common 
knowledge details, self-handicapping strategies, and complications, and 
exhibit the highest proportions of complications and core details, 
whereas those who are not asked to sketch and narrate (Sketch control 
condition) will report the least details (Sketch main effect). 
Hypothesis 2. Truth tellers will provide more total details, core de-
tails, and complications and fewer peripheral details, common knowl-
edge details, and self-handicapping strategies, exhibit higher 
proportions of complications and core details, and sound more plausible 
than lie tellers (Veracity main effect). 
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Hypothesis 3. The Veracity effects will be most profound in the Sketch 
Weeks 1 and 2 condition and least profound in the Sketch control con-
dition (Sketch × Veracity interaction effect). 
In addition to testing the above hypotheses, we also wanted to get 
insight into different strategies that truth tellers and lie tellers prepare 
and use in multiple interviews, so we asked participants about their 
preparation strategies and their convincing strategies during the in-
terviews. Also, to examine differences in perceptions between truth 
tellers and lie tellers concerning the sketching while narrating task, we 
asked those who sketched about the extent to which they thought this 
task was difficult. 
3. Method 
3.1. Participants and design 
The required sample size was determined using G*Power software. 
The analysis revealed that to achieve high power of 0.99, a moderate to 
large effect size of f2 = 0.11, and an error probability of 1% (α = 0.01), at 
least 217 participants were needed. 
We recruited a total of 248 student and staff members at the Uni-
versity of Portsmouth between October 2019 and February 2020. We did 
not set any inclusion criteria other than that participants should be 18 
years or older. One participant withdrew during the first session, and 
four others did not attend the following sessions. Therefore, the final 
sample included a total of 243 participants (70% female, Mage = 24.05, 
SDage = 9.87). 
Approximately half (57%) of the participants were British, and the 
remaining participants were European (17%), Asian (13%), African 
(2%), Arab (1%), of mixed ethnicity (7%), or of other background (2%). 
Due to a technical error, we could not know the ethnicity of four par-
ticipants. Although 43% of the participants were non-native English 
speakers, we do not anticipate that this would have affected the results 
as it has been shown that non-native but highly proficient speakers 
provide statements that are similar to those of native speakers (Evans 
et al., 2017). Also, English is a requirement at the corresponding uni-
versity, so participants are expected to be highly proficient English 
speakers. To corroborate this conclusion, we examined potential dif-
ferences between the British and non-British participants in our sample. 
We ran two sets of one-way multivariate analyses of variance (MAN-
OVAs) with Ethnicity as the independent variable. In one set—for each 
of the Time 3 details and the unique details—we included core details, 
peripheral details, common knowledge details, self-handicapping stra-
tegies, complications, and plausibility as dependent variables, and in 
another set—also for each of the Time 3 details and the unique 
details—we included the proportion of complications, the proportion of 
core details, and total details as dependent variables. Missing cases were 
removed from the analyses. No significant differences emerged (all 
Pillai’s Trace < 0.21, all ps > .390). 
Participants either received two course credits or £30 for taking part 
in the study. They were also included in a draw to win one of three prizes 
(£50, £75, or £150). The experiment was approved by the standing ethics 
committee, and it complied with recognised ethics standards including 
the Declaration of Helsinki and the UK Integrity Office Code of Practice. 
Participants were randomly allocated to the Sketch and Veracity 
conditions. The sample included 122 truth tellers and 121 lie tellers. 
Among truth tellers, 30 participants were allocated to the Sketch Week 1 
or the Sketch Weeks 1 and 2 conditions, and 31 participants to the 
Sketch Week 2 or control conditions. Among lie tellers, 30 participants 
were allocated to the Sketch Week 1, Sketch Week 2, or Sketch Weeks 1 
and 2 conditions, and 31 participants to the control condition. 
To test the hypotheses, data were analysed using a 4 (Sketch: Week 1, 
Week 2, Weeks 1 and 2, control) × 2 (Veracity: truth teller, lie teller) 
between-subjects design with core details, peripheral details, common 
knowledge details, self-handicapping strategies, complications, 
plausibility, proportion of complications, proportion of core details, and 
total details as dependent variables. 
3.2. Materials 
Before each interview at Times 1, 2, and 3, participants completed an 
automated pre-interview questionnaire that was created via Qualtrics 
software. In each pre-interview questionnaire, they rated on 7-point 
Likert scales ranging from 1 = not at all to 7 = completely (a) their 
motivation to appear convincing during the interview, and (b) the extent 
to which their preparation for the interview was (i) sufficient, (ii) good, 
and (iii) thorough. They were also asked whether or not they prepared 
any strategies for the interview and to write down the preparation 
strategy or the reason for not preparing one. In addition, at Time 1, 
participants were asked about their background characteristics (age, 
sex, and ethnicity), and at Times 2 and 3, they were asked about any 
preparations they made during the past week outside the experiment 
setting. 
Participants also completed an automated post-interview question-
naire that was created via Qualtrics software after the interview at Time 
3. In this questionnaire, participants rated on 7-point scales (1 = not at 
all to 7 = completely) their motivation, perceived believability by the 
interviewer, likelihood of writing a statement, and probability of win-
ning the prize. Also, those who sketched rated the extent to which they 
thought the sketching task was difficult. As a manipulation check, par-
ticipants rated on percentage scales (0–100%) the extent to which they 
were truthful in the three interviews. In addition, participants were 
asked open questions about their convincing strategy. 
For the analyses, we calculated an average score for the three pre- 
interview motivation ratings and the post-interview motivation rating 
combined (α = 0.87). We also calculated an average preparation score 
(preparation efficiency) for the three pre-interview ratings combined 
about whether participants’ preparation was thorough, sufficient, and 
good (α = 0.93). 
3.3. Procedure 
The procedure was adapted from Leal et al. (2018). After participants 
arrived for their appointment at the Department of Psychology at Time 
1, they signed a consent form and were then randomly allocated to the 
truth teller or lie teller condition. Truth tellers were asked to think of a 
memorable event that happened to them in the past two years. The event 
should have been out of the ordinary that they (or others) do not 
experience daily. Truth tellers were given examples of such events (e.g., 
seeing a famous person when they were out for dinner, or going on a 
pheasant shoot). Lie tellers and truth tellers were matched for memo-
rable events. That is, lie tellers were asked to lie about an event previ-
ously chosen by a truth teller and to pretend they experienced that 
event. Lie tellers were given information only about the main theme of 
the event, so they were not provided with specific details about the 
event. For example, if a truth teller reported about how she celebrated 
her 21st birthday by going for a bungee jump, the lie teller was 
instructed to lie about how she celebrated her 21st birthday. Thus, lie 
tellers were free to fabricate the details they wanted about the story. The 
Sketch condition was randomly allocated to truth tellers, but lie tellers 
were allocated to the same Sketch condition as the truth tellers with 
whom they were matched. 
All participants were informed that they will be interviewed about 
the event in three interviews—each one week apart—and that they will 
need to convince the interviewer they are honest. To motivate partici-
pants, they were told that if they are convincing, their names will be 
entered in a draw to win £50, £75, or £150. However, if they are not 
convincing, they will be asked to write a statement about the event and 
their names will not be entered in the draw. At Times 2 and 3, partici-
pants were given the same motivating instructions again and told that 
their name will be entered in the draw for a second (or third) time if they 
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are convincing in the corresponding interview. If they are not 
convincing, they will have to write a statement. In reality, all partici-
pants were entered in the draw and none of them was asked to write a 
statement. All participants were given as much time as they need to 
prepare for the interview. 
Before each interview, participants completed an automated pre- 
interview questionnaire. After that, they were taken to the interview 
room where they were interviewed by one of four research assistants 
(interviewers), blind to the participants’ Veracity condition and to the 
study hypotheses. The same interviewer interviewed each participant at 
Times 1, 2, and 3. However, for reasons beyond our control, the same 
interviewer could not be available for eight participants, so a different 
interviewer took this role. Four one-way MANOVAs were conducted on 
the Time 3 details and the unique details to examine the effects of having 
the same or a different interviewer across interviews. For each of the 
Time 3 details and the unique details, one analysis included core details, 
peripheral details, common knowledge details, self-handicapping stra-
tegies, complications, and plausibility as dependent variables, and 
another analysis included proportion of complications, proportion of 
core details, and total details as dependent variables. No significant 
differences emerged (all Pillai’s Trace < 0.02, all ps > .682). Thus, 
changing interviewers did not have any effect on the results. 
The experimenter gave the interviewer a slip of paper on which the 
event, the event date, and the participant’s Sketch condition were 
written. The theme of the event was kept general (e.g., tell me about 
celebrating your 21st birthday in May 2019). The interviewer’s 
knowledge of the participant’s Sketch condition was not expected to 
affect their demeanor, because the interviewer did not know the study 
hypotheses or the participant’s Veracity condition. There is also no 
empirical evidence demonstrating an interviewer’s effect when the 
interviewee is verbally reporting versus sketching an event. 
For all participants, the interview started as follows: 
Could you please tell me in as much detail as possible everything 
about that event, but before doing so I would like you to take a few 
moments to picture in your mind that memorable event and think 
about where you were and what you saw, heard, felt and smelled 
during that time. Take a moment to think about all your senses 
during the event and then please let me know when you have done 
that? 
After indicating that they were ready, participants who were not 
assigned to sketch were asked, “Ok, now tell me in as much detail as 
possible everything you remember”. Participants who were assigned to a 
sketch condition were asked, “Ok, now could you please draw for me 
exactly what you could see at that time and whilst doing so, please 
describe in as much detail as possible everything that you remember 
about that event”. 
Participants sketched while narrating at Time 1 if they were allo-
cated to the Sketch Week 1 condition, at Time 2 if they were allocated to 
the Sketch Week 2 condition, and at Times 1 and 2 if they were allocated 
to the Sketch Weeks 1 and 2 condition. Participants in the Sketch control 
condition did not provide a sketch at all. 
After the interviews at Times 1 and 2, participants were scheduled 
for the next session. After the Time 3 interview, they were asked to 
complete an automated post-interview questionnaire, and then they 
were fully debriefed, rewarded, and thanked. 
3.4. Coding 
All interviews were audiotaped, transcribed and coded for details. 
Every noun, verb, adjective, and adverb was considered a single detail, 
but other details such as conjunctions, prepositions, and pronouns were 
not counted because they are not precise and thus not informative. For 
example, the statement “The festival was in a field in Glastonbury” in-
cludes three details. A distinction was made between core and 
peripheral details. A participant talking about going to a concert re-
ported, “I went with my friends to the concert where it was pretty 
crowded” and “I sat in the terminal and waited for ages for the ferry”. 
The first statement includes four core details central to the concert 
event, whereas the second statement includes five peripheral details 
happening after the concert and thus irrelevant to the concert event. 
Details that were repeated in a single interview were coded only once. 
Details mentioned in the second or third interview but not in a previous 
interview were coded as new details and classified into core or periph-
eral details. 
Two coders—both blind to participants’ veracity conditions—coded 
the transcripts independently for core and peripheral details. One coder 
coded all the transcripts, and the other coder coded 40 transcripts 
(16%). Inter-rater reliability analyses were computed using the Intra- 
Class Correlation (ICC) coefficient (single measures scores). ICC co-
efficients less than 0.40 are poor, between 0.40 and 0.59 are fair, be-
tween 0.60 and 0.74 are good, and between 0.75 and 1.0 are excellent 
(Hallgren, 2012). ICC was good for core details (ICC = 0.72) and pe-
ripheral details (ICC = 0.68). 
Two other coders—blind to participants’ veracity conditions—coded 
the transcripts independently for common knowledge details which are 
strongly invoked stereotypical knowledge about events (“The concert 
smelled of cigarettes and alcohol”), self-handicapping strategies which 
are explicit or implicit justifications as to why someone is not able to 
provide information (“We were lazy and we didn’t want to go to touristy 
places”), complications which are occurrences that make a situation 
more complex than necessary (“I remember coming into LAX actually 
having a cross wind landing, it was some quite strong winds trying to 
come in the landing, that was fun”), and plausibility which was defined 
as how likely is it that the activities happened in the way described and it 
was measured on a 7-point scale (1 = implausible to 7 = plausible). One 
coder coded 70 transcripts (29%) and the other coder coded all the 
transcripts. Inter-rater reliability was excellent for common knowledge 
details (ICC = 0.91), self-handicapping strategies (ICC = 1.00), com-
plications (ICC = 0.95), and plausibility (ICC = 0.81). 
Based on the coded details, the total number of details and the pro-
portion scores of (i) complications and (ii) core details were calculated 
for the Time 3 details and the unique details. The total number of details 
at Time 3 included the total number of core and peripheral details at 
Time 3. The proportion of complications at Time 3 was calculated as: 
complications at Time 3/(complications + common knowledge details 
+ self-handicapping strategies at Time 3). The proportion of core details 
at Time 3 was calculated as: core details at Time 3/(core details + pe-
ripheral details at Time 3). 
Unique total details were new core and peripheral details mentioned 
at Time 2 or Time 3 added to the core and peripheral details mentioned 
at Time 1. The proportion of unique complications was the total number 
of unique complications across the three interviews divided by the total 
number of unique complications, common knowledge details, and self- 
handicapping strategies across interviews. The proportion of unique 
core details was calculated by dividing the total number of unique core 
details across the three interviews by the total number of unique core 
and peripheral details across interviews. We also calculated unique 
plausibility by averaging plausibility scores at Times 1, 2, and 3. 
Participants’ open responses in the pre-interview and post-interview 
questionnaires regarding strategies used and reasons for (not) using a 
strategy were coded independently by the two coders who also coded 
core and peripheral details, both blind to the veracity conditions. One 
coder formulated categories based on participants’ responses to the 
questions and coded all the responses. Similar responses were grouped 
together in a single category, and each category was labelled to describe 
the theme of responses. When the same response could fit in more than 
one category, it was allocated to those corresponding categories. To 
assess inter-rater reliability, a second coder also coded all participants’ 
responses based on the corresponding categories. Disagreements were 
discussed and resolved. Inter-rater agreement was excellent, Cohen’s κ 
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= 0.81. The strategies are discussed in the Results. 
4. Results 
4.1. Pre-interview and post-interview questionnaires 
The results of responses to the questionnaires are included in the 
supplementary material. Compared to lie tellers, truth tellers were 
significantly more truthful, more likely to think they were believed by 
the interviewer, and less likely to believe they will have to write a 
statement. Truth tellers and lie tellers were equally and highly moti-
vated, and they did not significantly differ in their perceptions on the 
likelihood of winning a prize, the difficulty of the sketching while 
narrating task, and the efficiency of their preparations. Significantly 
more lie tellers than truth tellers reported preparing (or using) a 
convincing strategy during the experimental sessions and prior to the 
third session. Truth tellers predominantly reported that they were 
truthful and detailed, whereas lie tellers’ most frequently reported 
strategies were to use an embedded lie (a truthful account that includes 
fabricated details), remain consistent across interviews (e.g., stick to the 
same story), control nonverbal behaviour (e.g., not hesitate, stay calm, 
be confident), rehearse using external resources (e.g., google relevant 
details, write down notes), and manage information (e.g., include spe-
cific core, perceptual, verifiable or other details, add new details in 
subsequent interviews, justify/avoid/make mistakes, pretend to forget). 
Lie tellers who did not prepare preferred to provide spontaneous re-
sponses or felt confident enough to lie. 
4.2. Hypotheses testing 
We carried out multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVAs) on the 
Time 3 details and the unique details. To test the multicollinearity 
assumption of MANOVA we examined correlations between variables 
that are higher than 0.80 (Grewal et al., 2004). The correlations are 
tabulated in Tables 1 and 2. High correlations emerged between core 
details and total details for the Time 3 details and for unique details (r =
0.98), and between peripheral details and proportion of core details for 
the Time 3 details (r = − 0.82) and for unique details (r = − 0.80). To 
avoid including highly correlated variables in a single analysis, we ran 
two sets of analyses on each of the Time 3 details and the unique details, 
one with the proportion scores (proportion of complications and pro-
portion of core details) and total details as dependent variables, and 
another one with the remaining cues as dependent variables (see Deeb, 
Vrij, & Leal, 2020 for similar analyses). 
We report below the results of the null hypotheses significance 
testing (NHST) along with Hedge’s g which is the unbiased correction of 
Cohen’s d effect size. An effect size of 0.2 is considered small, of 0.5 is 
considered medium, and of 0.8 is considered large. We also report 
Cohen’s U3 and the Probability of Superiority (PS). Cohen’s U3 (Cohen, 
1988) represents the percentage of non-overlap between means (i.e., the 
percentage of a population A which the upper half of the cases of a 
population B exceeds). For example, if Cohen’s U3 = 64% then the upper 
half of the experimental group (population B) exceeds 64% of the con-
trol group (population A). The PS demonstrates the probability that a 
randomly selected person from one group has a higher observed score 
than a randomly selected person from the other group (Fritz et al., 2012; 
Lakens, 2013; Magnusson, 2020). To further corroborate our results, we 
carried out Bayesian analyses of variance that test the likelihood of the 
data under both the null hypothesis (H0) and the alternative hypothesis 
(H1). Bayes factors (BF10) between 1 and 3 indicate weak evidence for 
the alternative hypothesis (H1), between 3 and 20 indicate positive 
evidence, between 20 and 150 indicate strong evidence, and above 150 
indicate very strong evidence (Jarosz & Wiley, 2014). The inverse of 
BF10 is BF01 (1/BF10) which is the likelihood of supporting evidence for 
the null hypothesis (H0) compared to the alternative hypothesis (H1). 
We report below BF10 statistics only as BF01 can be inferred by inversing 
BF10. Note that the prior probability distribution for each model was 
0.20, a default uniform prior that is distributed equally across models 
(see Wagenmakers et al., 2018). We also report inclusion probabilities 
for matched models (BFInclusion) that compare all models with interaction 
effects to all models that include the same predictors but without the 
interaction effects (van den Bergh et al., 2020). We conducted the an-
alyses for the NHST using SPSS statistical package and for the Bayesian 
testing using JASP software. 
4.2.1. Time 3 details 
A 4 (Sketch: Week 1, Week 2, Weeks 1 and 2, control) × 2 (Veracity: 
lie teller, truth teller) MANOVA with core details, peripheral details, 
common knowledge details, self-handicapping strategies, complica-
tions, and plausibility at Time 3 as dependent variables, revealed a 
significant multivariate effect of Veracity, Pillai’s Trace = 0.32, F(6, 
230) = 18.25, p < .001, η2 = 0.32. No significant effects emerged for 
Sketch, Pillai’s Trace = 0.10, F(18, 696) = 1.28, p = .191, η2 = 0.03, or 
the Sketch × Veracity interaction effect, Pillai’s Trace = 0.06, F(18, 
696) = 0.83, p = .668, η2 = 0.02. The Veracity effects revealed that at 
Time 3 (see Table 3), truth tellers reported more core details and com-
plications and fewer common knowledge details and self-handicapping 
strategies than lie tellers. Also, truth tellers’ statements sounded more 
Table 1 
















Core details   0.18**  − 0.10  − 0.09  0.71***  0.43***  0.24***  0.17**  0.98*** 




− 0.10  − 0.003   0.34***  − 0.14*  − 0.33***  − 0.35***  − 0.03  − 0.09 
Self-handicapping 
strategies  
− 0.09  − 0.04  0.34***   − 0.11  − 0.26***  − 0.24***  − 0.02  − 0.10 
Complications  0.71***  0.17**  − 0.14*  − 0.11   0.48***  0.45***  0.06  0.71*** 
Plausibility  0.43***  − 0.04  − 0.33***  − 0.26***  0.48***   0.42***  0.22***  0.40*** 
Proportion of 
complications  
0.24***  0.16*  − 0.35***  − 0.24***  0.45***  0.42***   − 0.05  0.26*** 
Proportion of core 
details  
0.17**  − 0.82***  − 0.03  − 0.02  0.06  0.22***  − 0.05   0.003 
Total details  0.98***  0.37***  − 0.09  − 0.10  0.71***  0.40***  0.26***  0.003   
* p < .05. 
** p < .01. 
*** p < .001. 
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plausible than lie tellers’ statements. Bayesian analyses revealed strong 
to very strong evidence for all these variables except for self- 
handicapping strategies which received weak evidence (BF10 = 0.92). 
A 4 (Sketch: Week 1, Week 2, Weeks 1 and 2, control) × 2 (Veracity: 
lie teller, truth teller) MANOVA with proportion of complications, pro-
portion of core details, and total details at Time 3 as dependent vari-
ables, revealed significant multivariate effects of Sketch, Pillai’s Trace =
0.10, F(9, 705) = 2.72, p = .004, η2 = 0.03, and Veracity, Pillai’s Trace 
= 0.14, F(3,233) = 12.43, p < .001, η2 = 0.14, but the Sketch × Veracity 
interaction effect was not significant, Pillai’s Trace = 0.04, F(9, 705) =
0.99, p = .448, η2 = 0.01. There was a significant Sketch main effect for 
the proportion of core details, F(3, 235) = 7.56, p < .001, η2 = 0.09, BF10 
= 209.14. At Time 3, the Sketch control condition (M = 0.83, SD = 0.19, 
95% CI [0.79, 0.88]) showed a lower proportion of core details than the 
Sketch Week 1 condition (M = 0.93, SD = 0.11, 95% CI [0.90, 0.96]), p 
= .001, Hedge’s g = 0.64, 95% CI [0.28, 1.01], Cohen’s U3 = 73.90, PS 
= 67.50, and the Sketch Weeks 1 and 2 condition (M = 0.94, SD = 0.11, 
95% CI [0.91, 0.96]), p < .001, Hedge’s g = 0.70, 95% CI [0.34, 1.08], 
Cohen’s U3 = 75.80, PS = 69.00. As for the Veracity effects at Time 3, 
Table 3 shows that the proportion scores of complications and core 
details and total details were higher among truth tellers than lie tellers, 
but the evidence for the proportion of core details was weak (BF10 =
1.24). 
4.2.2. Unique details 
A 4 (Sketch: Week 1, Week 2, Weeks 1 and 2, control) × 2 (Veracity: 
lie teller, truth teller) MANOVA with unique core, peripheral, and 
common knowledge details, self-handicapping strategies, complica-
tions, and plausibility as dependent variables, revealed significant 
multivariate effects of Sketch, Pillai’s Trace = 0.15, F(18, 696) = 1.96, p 
= .010, η2 = 0.05, and Veracity, Pillai’s Trace = 0.31, F(6, 230) = 17.37, 
p < .001, η2 = 0.31. The Sketch × Veracity interaction effect was not 
significant, Pillai’s Trace = 0.05, F(18, 696) = 0.69, p = .822, η2 = 0.02. 
A significant Sketch main effect emerged for unique peripheral details, F 
(3, 235) = 4.38, p = .005, η2 = 0.05, BF10 = 5.14. The Sketch Week 2 
condition (M = 21.61, SD = 26.14, 95% CI [14.91, 28.30]) elicited more 
peripheral details than the Sketch Weeks 1 and 2 condition (M = 10.33, 
SD = 19.12, 95% CI [5.39, 15.27]), p = .033, Hedge’s g = 0.49, 95% CI 
[0.13, 0.86], Cohen’s U3 = 68.80, PS = 63.60. As for veracity effects (see 
Table 4), positive to very strong evidence emerged that truth tellers’ 
Table 2 
















Core details   0.21**  0.04  − 0.02  0.75***  0.43***  0.21**  0.19**  0.98*** 




0.04  0.12   0.43***  − 0.09  − 0.38***  − 0.47***  − 0.06  0.06 
Self-handicapping 
strategies  
− 0.02  0.05  0.43***   − 0.07  − 0.31***  − 0.27***  − 0.05  − 0.01 
Complications  0.75***  0.18**  − 0.09  − 0.07   0.51***  0.33***  0.06  0.74*** 
Plausibility  0.43***  − 0.04  − 0.38***  − 0.31***  0.51***   0.48***  0.23***  0.39*** 
Proportion of 
complications  
0.21**  0.11  − 0.47***  − 0.27***  0.33***  0.48***   − 0.05  0.22** 
Proportion of core 
details  
0.19**  − 0.80***  − 0.06  − 0.05  0.06  0.23***  − 0.05   0.001 
Total details  0.98***  0.41***  0.06  − 0.01  0.74***  0.39***  0.22**  0.001   
** p < .01. 
*** p < .001. 
Table 3 
Descriptive and inferential statistics for Time 3 details as a function of veracity.  









effect n = 122 
M (SD) 
95% CI n = 121 
M (SD) 
95% CI 








20.39  <.001 0.58 [0.32, 
0.84]  
71.90  65.90 1669.05 1681.35  0.08 








00.02  .886 0.02 
[− 0.24, 
0.27]  












11.49  .001 0.44 [0.18, 
0.70]  











04.05  .045 0.22 
[− 0.03, 
0.48]  









28.95  <.001 0.70 [0.44, 
0.96]  









108.62  <.001 1.34 [1.07, 
1.63]  















18.43  <.001 0.55 [0.30, 
0.81]  
70.90  65.10 723.78 723.59  0.11 










05.05  .026 0.28 [0.03, 
0.54]  
61.00  57.80 01.24 01.55  0.23 








17.66  <.001 0.54 [0.29, 
0.80]  
70.50  64.90 535.65 536.75  0.07  
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statements included more unique core details and complications and 
fewer unique common knowledge details and self-handicapping strate-
gies than lie tellers’ statements. Also, very strong evidence emerged that 
truth tellers’ statements sounded more plausible than lie tellers’ 
statements. 
Another 4 (Sketch: Week 1, Week 2, Weeks 1 and 2, control) × 2 
(Veracity: lie teller, truth teller) MANOVA was conducted with the 
proportion of unique complications, proportion of unique core details, 
and total unique details as dependent variables. The analysis revealed a 
significant main effect of Sketch, Pillai’s Trace = 0.15, F(9, 705) = 4.00, 
p < .001, η2 = 0.05, and Veracity, Pillai’s Trace = 0.17, F(3, 233) =
16.06, p < .001, η2 = 0.17. The Sketch × Veracity interaction effect was 
not significant, Pillai’s Trace = 0.03, F(9, 705) = 0.69, p = .716, η2 =
0.01. A significant Sketch main effect emerged for the proportion of 
unique core details, F(3, 235) = 10.86, p < .001, η2 = 0.12, BF10 =
10,893.99. This proportion score was lower in the Sketch control con-
dition (M = 0.81, SD = 0.20, 95% CI [0.76, 0.86]) than in the Sketch 
Week 1 condition (M = 0.92, SD = 0.12, 95% CI [0.89, 0.95]), p < .001, 
Hedge’s g = 0.66, 95% CI [0.30, 1.03], Cohen’s U3 = 74.50, PS = 68.00, 
and in the Sketch Weeks 1 and 2 condition (M = 0.93, SD = 0.10, 95% CI 
[0.91, 0.96]), p < .001, Hedge’s g = 0.75, 95% CI [0.39, 1.13], Cohen’s 
U3 = 77.30, PS = 70.20. The Veracity effects (Table 4) demonstrated 
that the proportions of unique complications and unique core details and 
total unique details were higher among truth tellers than lie tellers, but 
the proportion of unique core details received weak evidence (BF10 =
1.39). 
Overall, the results for the Time 3 details and unique details were 
similar. In both analyses, Hypothesis 1 that predicted a Sketch main 
effect at Time 3 and for unique details was supported only for the pro-
portion of core details, with peripheral details showing positive evi-
dence for unique details only. Hypothesis 2 that predicted Veracity main 
effects at Time 3 and for unique details was supported for all details 
except for peripheral details (not significant and received weak evidence 
in both analyses) and for proportion of core details (significant in both 
analyses but received weak evidence). Self-handicapping strategies was 
a diagnostic Veracity cue in the unique details analysis but not in the 
Time 3 analysis (significant but weak evidence). Hypothesis 3 that 
predicted interaction effects was not supported. 
4.3. Exploratory analyses 
4.3.1. Time 1 details 
The absence of Sketch related effects goes against the general trend 
found in the interviewing literature where sketching while narrating has 
been found to be beneficial for eliciting information and veracity cues. A 
possible explanation is that we analysed details provided at Time 3 and 
unique details provided throughout the three interviews rather than 
details provided at Time 1. Since to date all sketching deception research 
measured the effect of sketching at Time 1, we carried out exploratory 
analyses on the Time 1 details. We dichotomised the Sketch factor into 
Sketch absent versus Sketch present at Time 1. 
A 2 (Sketch: absent vs present) × 2 (Veracity: truth teller, lie teller) 
MANOVA was carried out with core details, peripheral details, common 
knowledge details, self-handicapping strategies, complications, and 
plausibility at Time 1 as dependent variables. Significant multivariate 
effects emerged for Sketch, Pillai’s Trace = 0.12, F(6, 234) = 5.26, p <
.001, η2 = 0.12, and Veracity, Pillai’s Trace = 0.25, F(6, 234) = 13.26, p 
< .001, η2 = 0.25. The Sketch × Veracity interaction effect was not 
significant, Pillai’s Trace = 0.02, F(6, 234) = 0.82, p = .555, η2 = 0.02. A 
significant Sketch main effect emerged for core details, F(1, 239) =
13.70, p < .001, η2 = 0.05, BF10 = 54.34, and peripheral details, F(1, 
239) = 11.16, p = .001, η2 = 0.05, BF10 = 26.23. Participants who 
sketched at Time 1 provided more core details (M = 89.27, SD = 61.28, 
95% CI [78.19, 100.34]) than those who did not sketch (M = 64.11, SD 
= 47.49, 95% CI [55.63, 72.58]), p < .001, Hedge’s g = 0.46, 95% CI 
[0.20, 0.71], Cohen’s U3 = 67.70, PS = 62.80. Also, those who sketched 
at Time 1 provided fewer peripheral details (M = 6.08, SD = 12.48, 95% 
CI [3.82, 8.33]) than those who did not sketch (M = 12.75, SD = 17.99, 
95% CI [9.54, 15.96]), p = .001, Hedge’s g = 0.43, 95% CI [0.18, 0.69], 
Cohen’s U3 = 66.60, PS = 61.90. The Veracity effects (Table 5) 
demonstrated that at Time 1, truth tellers’ statements included more 
core details and complications and fewer common knowledge details 
than lie tellers’ statements. Truth tellers’ statements also sounded more 
plausible than lie tellers’ statements. 
Another 2 (Sketch: absent vs present) × 2 (Veracity: truth teller, lie 
teller) MANOVA was carried out with proportion of complications, 
proportion of core details, and total details at Time 1 as dependent 
variables. Significant multivariate effects emerged for Sketch, Pillai’s 
Table 4 
Descriptive and inferential statistics for unique details as a function of veracity.  









effect n = 122 
M (SD) 
95% CI n = 121 
M (SD) 
95% CI 








18.83  <.001 0.55 [0.30, 
0.81]  











00.09  .771 0.03 
[− 0.22, 
0.29]  












17.23  <.001 0.53 [0.27, 
0.78]  












08.50  .004 0.35 [0.10, 
0.61]  











26.31  <.001 0.66 [0.40, 
0.92]  
74.50  68.00 25,104.27 25,148.55  0.06 








103.92  <.001 1.30 [1.03, 
1.59]  
















28.42  <.001 0.68 [0.42, 
0.94]  












05.49  .020 0.27 [0.02, 
0.53]  











15.48  <.001 0.51 [0.25, 
0.76]  
69.50  64.10 194.74 195.81  0.06  
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Trace = 0.15, F(3, 237) = 13.69, p < .001, η2 = 0.15, and Veracity, 
Pillai’s Trace = 0.12, F(3, 237) = 10.53, p < .001, η2 = 0.12. The Sketch 
× Veracity interaction effect was not significant, 
Pillai’s Trace = 0.004, F(3, 237) = 0.34, p = .799, η2 = 0.004. A 
significant Sketch main effect emerged for total details, F(1, 239) = 6.25, 
p = .013, η2 = 0.03, BF10 = 2.26, and proportion of core details, F(1, 
239) = 29.61, p < .001, η2 = 0.11, BF10 = 83,721.79. Bayesian analyses 
revealed weak evidence for total details (BF10 = 2.26). The proportion of 
core details at Time 1 was higher among those who sketched (M = 0.94, 
SD = 0.10, 95% CI [0.93, 0.96]) than among those who did not sketch 
(M = 0.85, SD = 0.17, 95% CI [0.82, 0.88]), p < .001, Hedge’s g = 0.64, 
95% CI [0.39, 0.90], Cohen’s U3 = 73.90, PS = 67.50. As for the Veracity 
main effect, truth tellers reported significantly more total details and a 
higher proportion of complications than lie tellers (see Table 5). 
The results thus demonstrated that core details and peripheral details 
differed between the Sketching conditions and the Sketch control con-
dition at Time 1 but no longer at Time 3. To understand why core and 
peripheral details stopped having an effect over time as a function of 
Sketch instruction, we ran a mixed MANOVA with Sketch (Week 1, 
Week 2, Weeks 1 and 2, control) as between-subjects factor, Time as 
within-subjects factor, and the number of core details and peripheral 
details in the three interviews as the dependent variable. Significant 
effects emerged for Sketch, Pillai’s Trace = 0.09, F(6, 478) = 3.79, p =
.001, η2 = 0.05, for Time, Pillai’s Trace = 0.11, F(4, 236) = 7.38, p <
.001, η2 = 0.11, and for Time × Sketch, Pillai’s Trace = 0.15, F(12, 714) 
= 3.05, p < .001, η2 = 0.05. 
As we were interested in the interaction effect, we only report the 
results for the Time × Sketch effect. At the univariate level, there was an 
effect for core details, F(4.99, 397.77) = 5.03, p < .001, η2 = 0.06, but 
not for peripheral details, F(4.65, 370.72) = 1.00, p = .418, η2 = 0.01. 
Simple effects revealed that for the Sketch Week 1 condition, more core 
details were elicited at Time 1 (M = 89.82, SD = 60.75, 95% CI [74.12, 
105.51]) than at Time 2 (M = 74.80, SD = 55.61, 95% CI [60.43, 
89.17]), and at Time 3 (M = 73.18, SD = 63.77, 95% CI [56.71, 89.66]), 
p < .001. For the Sketch Week 2 condition, more core details were eli-
cited at Time 2 (M = 79.00, SD = 48.09, 95% CI [66.68, 91.32]) than at 
Time 3 (M = 71.13, SD = 44.83, 95% CI [59.65, 82.61]), p = .005. For 
the Sketch Weeks 1 and 2 condition, more core details were elicited at 
Time 1 (M = 88.72, SD = 62.32, 95% CI [72.62, 104.82], p = .019) and 
at Time 2 (M = 89.15, SD = 71.10, 95% CI [70.78, 107.52], p = .001) 
than at Time 3 (M = 79.83, SD = 72.04, 95% CI [61.22, 98.44]). No 
differences emerged for the Sketch control condition. These results 
demonstrate that participants reported more core details when they 
were asked to sketch and narrate than when they were asked to provide 
a verbal statement, but this effect did not last beyond the interview in 
which participants were asked to sketch. 
4.3.2. Diagnostic efficiency of the dependent variables 
We ran diagnostic tests by calculating the area under the receiver 
operating characteristic curve (AUC) for the Time 1, Time 3, and unique 
data to understand the diagnostic efficiency of the verbal cues assessed 
in the current study. As peripheral, details, common knowledge details, 
and self-handicapping strategies were higher among lie tellers than truth 
tellers, we reversed the values of those cues by subtracting them from 
one point higher than the highest value of the corresponding cue. The 
results are summarised in Table 6. Values above 0.5 indicate that the cue 
is significantly diagnostic; and the higher the value, the more diagnostic 
the cue. All cues except for peripheral details and self-handicapping 
strategies, and to some extent proportion of core details, differed 
Table 5 
Descriptive and Inferential Statistics for Time 1 Details as a Function of Veracity.  









effect n = 122 
M (SD) 
95% CI n = 121 
M (SD) 
95% CI 








15.79  <.001 0.49 [0.24, 
0.75]  
68.80  63.60 132.83 202.12  0.29 








00.22  .642 0.06 
[− 0.20, 
0.31]  












16.55  <.001 0.51 [0.26, 
0.77]  











03.14  .078 0.21 
[− 0.04, 
0.46]  









25.45  <.001 0.64 [0.38, 
0.90]  









76.67  <.001 1.11 [0.85, 
1.39]  















18.82  <.001 0.54 [0.28, 
0.80]  
70.50  64.90 815.96 826.57  0.21 










03.07  .081 0.21 
[− 0.05, 
0.46]  
58.30  55.90 00.50 00.60  0.18 








12.41  .001 0.44 [0.19, 
0.70]  
67.00  62.20 37.69 42.07  0.25  
Table 6 
Area under the curve (AUC) for Time 1 details, Time 3 details, and unique 
details.  
Detail type Time 1 details 
[95% CI] 








0.66 [0.59, 0.73] 


















0.55 [0.48, 0.63] 




0.72 [0.66, 0.78] 











0.67 [0.60, 0.73] 






0.58 [0.50, 0.65] 




0.64 [0.57, 0.71]  
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significantly from chance (0.5). Plausibility showed the highest diag-
nosticity (average diagnosticity = 0.810) followed by complications, 
proportion of complications, core details, and total details (average 
diagnosticity = 0.70, 0.649, 0.653, and 0.635 respectively). 
We further explored if looking at all cues combined would enhance 
diagnosticity by averaging all the cues for Time 1 details, Time 3 details, 
and unique details. The results of this analysis revealed that the AUC for 
the Time 1 details was 0.64, 95% CI [0.58, 0.71], for the Time 3 details 
was 0.68, 95% CI [0.61, 0.75], and for unique details was 0.67, 95% CI 
[0.60, 0.74]. 
5. Discussion 
5.1. Veracity effects: robust verbal differences 
We compared the verbal responses of truth tellers and lie tellers at 
three occasions: (a) Time 1, (b) Time 3 and (c) across the three in-
terviews (unique details). The three comparisons showed strong overlap. 
In each comparison, truth tellers reported more core details, complica-
tions, and total details, fewer common knowledge details, and a higher 
proportion of complications than lie tellers. In addition, in each com-
parison truth tellers’ stories sounded more plausible than lie tellers’ 
stories. The ROC curve analyses provided further support for the overlap 
of the results. This overlap means that if, for whatever reason, in-
vestigators only have access to the third interview, they would not be in 
a disadvantageous position for assessing veracity. It also means that lie 
tellers did not become better at the task during the course of the multiple 
interviews. This can be explained by the strategies they reported to have 
used, as their two favourite strategies “remain consistent throughout the 
interviews” and “control nonverbal behaviour” do not address the ve-
racity cues examined here. The results thus add to the robustness of the 
examined veracity cues. Previous research has shown them to be diag-
nostic in single interview settings (Vrij, Deeb, et al., 2020; Vrij, Leal, 
Mann, Fisher, et al., 2018), but they also appear to be diagnostic in 
multiple interview settings (also see also Deeb, Vrij, & Leal, 2020). 
As in previous research (Deeb, Vrij, & Leal, 2020; Vrij, Leal, Jupe, & 
Harvey, 2018; Vrij & Vrij, 2020), complications and the proportion of 
complications received stronger evidence than the “total details” vari-
able. The proportion variable takes the differences in speech content 
between truth tellers and lie tellers better into account than the total 
details variable. That is, lie tellers often report fewer details than truth 
tellers, which makes the total details variable a diagnostic veracity cue. 
However, truth tellers and lie tellers also differ in the types of detail they 
report: Complications (truth tellers) versus common knowledge details 
and self-handicapping strategies (lie tellers). These differences between 
truth tellers and lie tellers in the types of detail they report are taken into 
consideration in the proportion of complications variable but not in the 
total details variable, making the proportion of complications variable 
more diagnostic. 
Out of the three variables—complications, common knowledge de-
tails and self-handicapping strategies—complications was the most 
diagnostic veracity cue. This reflects the verbal veracity literature (e.g., 
Masip et al., 2005) where it is generally found that cues to truthfulness 
(cues more frequently reported by truth tellers than lie tellers) are more 
diagnostic than cues to deceit (cues more frequently reported by lie 
tellers than truth tellers). 
Nonetheless, it is beneficial to consider a mixture of cues to truth-
fulness and deceit than just examining cues to truthfulness—see the 
proportion of complications versus total details discussion above. The 
lack of cues to deceit was recently addressed as one of the important 
shortcomings in the verbal deception literature (Nahari et al., 2019) and 
researchers should continue their search for them. 
Plausibility was the most diagnostic veracity cue examined. Similar 
findings emerged in previous research (Sporer et al., 2020; Vrij, Deeb, 
et al., 2020; Vrij, Leal, et al., 2020). Despite the strong potential of 
plausibility as a veracity cue, it is rarely examined by verbal deception 
researchers. One problem is that plausibility is a subjective, qualitative 
cue that cannot be quantified in frequency of occurrence. Subjectivity 
indicates a lack of standardisation which is problematic when used in 
real life settings. However, as plausibility seems to discriminate truth 
tellers and lie tellers relatively well, we think that it deserves attention. 
It is reasonable to suggest that plausibility consists of a cluster of verbal 
cues and it is worthwhile to examine which cues these are. One obvious 
candidate is the context in which the information is presented, whereby 
abnormal or impossible activities are considered implausible (Blair 
et al., 2010). However, there are probably more cues to consider. 
The proportion of core details was not highly diagnostic although it 
differed significantly from chance levels (see ROC analysis). We thus 
partially replicated the findings of the only other deception study that 
examined the proportion of core details in multiple interviews (Deeb, 
Vrij, & Leal, 2020). In that study strong evidence was found that truth 
tellers provided a higher proportion of core details than lie tellers. Our 
data do not allow us to explain the discrepancy in findings, even more so 
because Deeb, Vrij, and Leal (2020) used the same “describe a memo-
rable event” scenario used in the current experiment. More research is 
needed to examine the potential of the proportion of core details as a 
veracity cue. 
5.2. Sketch effects: the importance of details surrounding the centrality of 
the event 
The sketching while narrating interview technique elicited a high 
proportion of core details at Times 1 and 3, and for unique details. This 
means that the Sketch instruction given at Time 1 made participants 
more focused on reporting core elements even at Time 3 when a sketch 
instruction was no longer present. Since investigators are typically 
mostly interested in core details, this can be considered a positive effect. 
To our knowledge this is the first experiment where a distinction was 
made between core and peripheral details in sketching while narrating. 
We think this distinction is worthwhile to examine in future studies. 
More core details were elicited in interviews involving a sketch than 
in interviews involving a verbal statement, but this effect did not last 
beyond the interview in which the sketch was introduced. In other 
words, in terms of the number of core details reported, sketching did not 
have a spill-over effect to later interviews; the Sketch effect was only 
visible in the proportion of core details as discussed in the previous 
paragraph. Nonetheless, core details were not examined in previous 
sketching research, and this cue seems promising for the purpose of 
eliciting valuable information in single interviews. 
Contrary to our expectations, we did not find differences between the 
Sketching and control conditions for complications, common knowledge 
details, and self-handicapping strategies. Previous studies on sketching 
while narrating in single interviews also failed to elicit some of these 
cues, particularly when they occurred infrequently (Vrij et al., 2019; 
Vrij, Mann, et al., 2020). As Tables 3 through 5 show, common knowl-
edge details and self-handicapping strategies occurred infrequently. This 
may be caused by the type of deception scenario we used: To describe a 
unique event that was memorable. Lie tellers may find it difficult to rely 
on common knowledge when describing a unique event and may think 
that self-handicapping strategies are not suitable when they are sup-
posed to describe a clearly memorable event. 
5.3. Sketch × Veracity interaction effects: potential impact of the event 
and the interview technique 
We did not find a Sketch × Veracity interaction effect, which means 
that, unlike what was hypothesised, sketching did not facilitate lie 
detection. This could be the result of a ceiling effect: Core details at Time 
1 (Table 5) and Time 3 (Table 3) did not differ much for truth tellers, 
meaning that they did not have enough additional details to elaborate on 
their stories at Time 3 compared to Time 1. This will decrease the chance 
of an interaction effect to occur. 
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Alternatively, perhaps a selection of participants described an event 
for which sketching may be less suitable. Sketching is a visual output, so 
it may not be very beneficial in situations when interviewees do not 
describe visual experiences. Also, a sketch represents a specific moment 
in time, and it will be particularly useful for someone specifying a single 
event happening at a certain time (e.g., being in a restaurant) rather than 
for someone describing a sequence of events (e.g., a day long hiking 
trip). Most participants reported a visual experience in the interviews, 
but these were mostly sequences of events. 
5.4. Methodological considerations 
Participants reported positive events only as we did not want to 
induce stress in the experiment. Future research could examine if the 
same cues are elicited when negative events are reported in an ethically 
approved experiment. For instance, memory research has shown that 
negative events, compared to positive and neutral events, have differ-
ential effects on core and peripheral details (Herlihy et al., 2002; Herlihy 
et al., 2012). Truth tellers are less able to recall peripheral details con-
cerning negative events than concerning positive events. Negative or 
positive valence should have no effect on lie tellers, and therefore ve-
racity effects may be most diagnostic if negative events are reported due 
to lie tellers focusing more than truth tellers on peripheral details. 
5.5. Conclusions 
Although sketching while narrating did not facilitate lie detection, it 
was effective for making interviewees focus on core aspects of the re-
ported event; an effect that carried over to later interviews where a 
sketch was no longer introduced. Veracity effects remained constant 
across multiple interviews demonstrating that access to an initial or a 
third interview is equally effective for detecting deception. 
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